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United States v. O'Hagan: Recognition of the 
Misappropriation Theory· 
I. INTRODUCfiON 
In United States v. O'Hagan, the United States Supreme Court ac-
cepted misappropriation of information from whatever source as a basis 
for finding a violation of § 1 O(b) and Rule 1 Ob-5 of the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934. 1 The misappropriation theory is a way that vari-
ous courts in the past have imposed liability on people trading securities 
on the basis of misappropriated information.2 Historically, only those 
who could be classified as insiders3 were held liable under a theory of 
insider trading for violating§ lO(b) and Rule 10b-5. However, because of 
its broad reading of§ lO(b) and Rule lOb-5, the Court accepted the mis-
appropriation theory and extended such liability to all people who misap-
propriate4 material, nonpublic information and use that information in an 
exchange of securities.5 
The ability to apply the misappropriation theory is an important vic-
tory for the government because it creates liability for all people who 
fraudulently trade securities, regardless of the relationship between the 
misappropriator and the corporation whose stocks are being traded.6 Al-
lowing people to trade on the basis of inside information, whether they 
receive that information through an insider position or through some 
other means, threatens the honesty and integrity of the securities market.7 
Misappropriators should face liability for their actions. This note ad-
* Copyright © 1998 Brian Morgan. 
I. United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997). 
2. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 566 (2d Cir. 1991) (en bane); SEC v. 
Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 410 (7th Cir. 1991); SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 453 (9th Cir. 1990). 
3. An insider can be defined as: 
[A] person recognized or accepted as a member of a group, category, or organization: 
as A: a person who is in a position of power or has access to confidential information 
B: one (as an officer or director) who is in a position to have special knowledge of the 
affairs of or to influence the decisions of a company. 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, Tenth Ed. 1995. 
4. A person need not be an insider in order to be a misappropriator. A misappropriator is 
one who illegally obtains information. 
5. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2205. 
6. See Bruce A. Hiler, United States v. O'Hagan: The Supreme Court Upholds the 
Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading Liability, INSIGHTS, Sept. 1997, at 2. 
7. See 15 U.S.C. § 78(b). 
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dresses the question of whether the Court's broad reading of§ IO(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 is the most appropriate way to legitimize the misappropriation 
theory and proposes that it is not. Instead of such a broad reading, the 
Court should have either clarified the boundaries of the theory or com-
pletely refrained from approving the theory. 
Although the Court has clearly expressed its willingness to use the 
misappropriation theory to convict those who violate § 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5, questions remain as to how the theory should be applied.8 It is im-
portant that both misappropriators and insiders be held liable, but it is 
equally important to define with reasonable certainty the kind of conduct 
that gives rise to such liability.9 Rather than leaving that task to the lower 
courts, it would be more appropriate to approach the problem in a way 
that is less likely to perpetuate the uncertainties inherent in the misappro-
priation theory. 
This note addresses the strengths and weaknesses of the Court's anal-
ysis in 0 'Hagan. Part II gives a historical background of the events lead-
ing up to the O'Hagan case and the misappropriation theory. Part III 
gives the factual background of the case. Part IV explains the Court's rea-
soning in O'Hagan. Part V criticizes the newly approved misappropria-
tion theory and part VI gives several alternatives to interpreting § IO(b) 
broadly enough to uphold the misappropriation theory. 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § JO(b), and Rule JOb-5 
In response to the stock market crash of 1929 and the Great Depres-
sion that followed, Congress passed the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(Exchange Act). 10 The primary purpose of the Exchange Act was to pro-
mote the stability and confidence of the stock market and to prevent 
fraud, thereby encouraging investors to invest their money in securities .11 
One portion of the Exchange Act that was promulgated specifically 
for the purpose of prohibiting fraudulent exchanges of securities is 
§ lO(b). In pertinent part, this section explains that it shall be unlawful: 
8. See Hiler, supra note 6. 
9. See David M. Brodsky & Daniel J. Kramer, A Critique of the Misappropriation Theory 
of Insider Trading, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY, May 16, 1997, at 105, 133-34. 
10. See. Shawn J. undquist, Note, United States v. O'Hagan: The Eighth Circuit Throws 
the Second Strike to the Misappropriation Theory of Rule /Ob-5 Liability, 1997 BYU L. REV. 197, 
198 (1997). 
II. See 15 U.S.C. § 78. 
147] MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY 
To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any secu-
rity ... , any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contra-
vention of such rules and regulations as the [Securities and Exchange] 
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public 
interest or for the protection of investors. 12 
149 
In an effort to curtail securities exchanges based on information not 
made available to the trading public, and in accordance with its rule mak-
ing authority, the Securities and Exchange Commission later adopted 
Rule IOb-5. This rule makes it: 
[U]nlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of 
any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) To employ any de-
vice, scheme, or artifice to defraud, [or] ... (c) To engage in any act, 
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a 
fraud or deceit upon any person, 'in connection with the purchase or 
sale of any security.' 13 
Together, Rule IOb-5 and § lO(b) have become "the basic federal 
antifraud provisions used by the SEC." 14 
B. Enforcing the Act 
As an antifraud provision, § IO(b) and Rule lOb-S have been nar-
rowed to a protection against insider trading. Two theories arose from 
attempting to protect against insider trading, the classical theory of liabil-
ity and the misappropriation theory. Both of these theories demonstrate 
ways in which there will be liability for trading securities on information 
that is not made available to the public. 
1. The classical theory of liability for insider trading. 
Under the classical theory, a person can be held liable for insider 
trading "when a corporate insider trades in the securities of his corpora-
tion on the basis of material, nonpublic information." 15 The classical the-
ory applies to insiders, defined as "officers, directors, and other perma-
nent insiders of a corporation," as well as "attorneys, accountants, consul-
tants, and others who temporarily become fiduciaries of a corporation." 16 
Because of their relationship with a company, these insiders have infor-
12. IS U.S.C. § 78j(b). 
13. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1996). 
14. Lindquist, supra note 10, at 199. 
15. United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2207 (1997). 
16. /d. 
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mation about the company that is not readily available to the public. By 
allowing an insider to trade securities on the basis of material, nonpublic 
information, the purpose of the Exchange Act is undermined. Therefore, 
under this theory, liability would arise if an insider trades without disclo-
sure of their intent to trade securities. 
2. The misappropriation theory of liability for insider trading. 
The misappropriation theory is much broader than the classical the-
ory. Under this theory, liability arises when a person "misappropriates 
confidential information for securities trading purposes in breach of a 
duty owed to the source of the information."17 This theory bases liability 
"on a fiduciary-turned trader's deception of those who entrusted him with 
access to confidential information."18 Here, there is no need to be an in-
sider of the corporation as defined in the classical theory. A fiduciary 
duty to the provider of information is sufficient to establish § I O(b) and 
Rule 1 Ob-5 liability. 
C. Split Jurisdictions 
For many years the Supreme Court declined to rule on the validity of 
the misappropriation theory. 19 This caused a split in federal jurisdictions 
as to whether or not the misappropriation theory was a valid basis for a 
cause of action. Three circuit courts saw the Supreme Court's silence as 
approval of the theory,20 while two circuits read this silence as disap-
proval of the theory.Z 1 
1. Jurisdictions in favor of the misappropriation theory. 
The Second Circuit was the first to openly adopt the misappropriation 
theory by the decision in United States v. Newman. 22 Later, sitting en 
bane, the Second Circuit ratified the theory.23 The Seventh and Ninth Cir-
cuits followed the Second Circuit by also ruling the misappropriation the-
ory was an appropriate basis for a cause of action to establish insider 
trading liability under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. 24 Even though the Su-
17. /d. 
18. /d. 
19. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); Carpenter v. United States, 484 
U.S. 19 (1987). 
20. See infra part II, section C, subsection I for specific cases and citations. 
21. See infra part II, section C, subsection 2 for specific cases and citations. 
22. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981). 
23. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 566 (2d Cir. 1991) (en bane). 
24. See S.E.C. v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 410 (7th Cir. 1991); S.E.C. v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439. 
453 (9th Cir. 1990). 
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preme Court had not yet recognized such a theory, these lower courts 
deemed the misappropriation theory "compatible with the broad lan-
guage" of§ lO(b) and Rule lOb-5.25 
2. Jurisdictions opposed to the misappropriation theory. 
The Fourth Circuit questioned the validity of the misappropriation 
theory and ruled it was an invalid basis for a cause of action in United 
States v. Bryan.26 The court in Bryan reasoned that the Supreme Court in 
Dirks v. S.E.C. 27 warned against further broadening the language of 
§ IO(b) and Rule IOb-5.28 In the predecessor to the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in O'Hagan, the Eighth Circuit also ruled against the misappropria-
tion theory.29 Similar to the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit, the Eighth 
Circuit reasoned that the misappropriation theory did not fit within the 
confines of Supreme Court precedent. 30 
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
A. Factual History 
The Respondent, James Herman O'Hagan, was a partner in the law 
firm of Dorsey & Whitney (Dorsey) in Minneapolis, Minnesota.31 Dorsey 
was involved in representing Grand Metropolitan PLC (Grand Met) in a 
potential tender offer for the public stock of Pillsbury Company.32 Al-
though O'Hagan was not personally involved in representing Grand Met, 
the jury determined that he misappropriated information from Dorsey 
regarding the tender offer, and in tum used that information to exchange 
securities on the basis of nonpublic information.33 Over a period of ap-
proximately two months, O'Hagan purchased stock and call options in 
Pillsbury stock totaling 7,500 shares.34 After the announcement of the 
tender offer, O'Hagan sold his stock and call options which resulted in a 
profit of more than $4.3 million.35 
B. Procedural History 
25. Clark, 915 F.2d at 453. See also Cheri[, 933 F.2d at 410. 
26. 58 F.3d 933, 943-59 (4th Cir. 1995). 
27. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
28. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 943-59. 
29. United States v. O'Hagan, 93 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996). 
30. See /d. 
31. See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199,2205 (1997). 
32. See !d. 
33. See /d. 
34. See /d. 
35. See !d. 
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O'Hagan was convicted in district court for 57 counts of mail fraud, 
securities fraud, and money laundering, and he was sentenced to a 41-
month term of imprisonment.36 The convictions were based in part on the 
misappropriation theory under§ lO(b) and Rule lOb-5. The Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit reversed all of the convictions, holding that 
trading securities by using misappropriated information will not incur 
§ 1 O(b) and Rule lOb-5 liability. 37 It was held that according to the strict 
reading of the statute, and according to Supreme Court precedent, the 
misappropriation theory does not fit within the confines of § 1 O(b) and 
Rule lOb-5.38 
IV. REASONING 
A. Upholding the Misappropriation Theory 
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the Eighth Circuit's deci-
sion, interpreting § lOb and Rule lOb-5 broadly enough to include the 
misappropriation theory.39 The Court interpreted§ lO(b) and Rule lOb-5 
as requiring a two-prong test that would prohibit "(1) using any deceptive 
device (2) in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, in contra-
vention of rules prescribed by the Comrnission."40 By defining the 'in 
connection with' prong broadly, the Court found that securities traders 
who misappropriate information fall within these two prohibitions, and 
therefore the misappropriation theory was upheld. 
1. The first requirement: deceptive device 
Under the misappropriation theory, the 'deceptive device' require-
ment is fulfilled because the misappropriator does not disclose the misap-
propriated information. Nondisclosure is required since "the deception 
essential to the misappropriation theory involves feigning fidelity to the 
source of information."41 It thereby follows that "if the fiduciary discloses 
to the source that he plans to trade on the nonpublic information, there is 
no 'deceptive device' and thus no§ lO(b) violation."42 
2. The second requirement: in connection with a securities transaction 
36. See /d. 
37. See /d. at 2206. 
38. See /d.; See also United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996). 
39. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2206. 
40. /d. 
41. /d. at 2209. 
42. /d. 
147] MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY 153 
The 'in connection with' a securities transaction is consummated un-
der the misappropriation theory once a securities exchange occurs. Ac-
cording to the Court, since the only true benefit of the misappropriated 
information comes from the exchange of securities, this requirement is 
met once the exchange takes place.43 If, however, the misappropriated 
information has "value to the malefactor apart from [its] use in a securi-
ties transaction"44 then the 'in connection with' requirement is not met 
and there will be no§ IO(b) violation. 
B. Requirement of Scienter 
In response to the many arguments made by certain amici and in 
response to the dissent's opinion,45 the majority made it clear that a vital 
part of the decision rests on "two sturdy safeguards Congress has pro-
vided regarding scienter."46 The first of these safeguards is that "[t]o es-
tablish a criminal violation of Rule lOb-5, the Government must prove 
that a person 'willfully' violated the provision."47 The second safeguard 
provided by Congress is that "a defendant may not be imprisoned for vio-
lating Rule lOb-5 if he proves that he had no knowledge of the rule."48 
This second safeguard, however, does not apply to fines, and such fines 
can reach up to $1 million. 
V. ANALYSIS 
A. A Fuzzy 'In Connection With' Requirement 
One of the problems with interpreting§ lO(b) and Rule lOb-5 is that 
both contain very broad language. Because of this broad language, many 
questions have arisen as various courts try to define the scope of § 1 O(b) 
and Rule lOb-5 liability, especially as applied under the misappropriation 
theory.49 The Court in O'Hagan clarified the 'deceptive device' require-
ment of the misappropriation theory, but the 'in connection with' require-
ment is still unclear and the majority seems quite content in leaving the 
uncertainty in how to apply this second prong. 50 
43. See id. 
44. /d. 
45. See id. at 2221-25. 
46. !d. at 2214. 
47. /d. (citations omitted). 
48. !d. 
49. Brodsky, supra note 9, at 133-34; see also, Lindquist, supra note 10, at 200. 
SO. See Hiler, supra note 6, at 2-5. 
154 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 13 
1. The 'deceptive device' requirement: a clear definition 
Prior to O'Hagan, it was somewhat unclear as to§ 10(b)'s definition 
of deception in respect to the misappropriation theory. The Court clari-
fied the issue by explaining that 'deception' in the § lO(b) context is the 
nondisclosure of an agent's intent to buy or sell securitiesY Therefore, 
when a person has a fiduciary duty, or other legal obligation to a princi-
pal, that person must disclose any intention to use information gained as a 
result of the relationship in a securities exchange. "[F ]ull disclosure fore-
closes liability" since the "deception essential to the misappropriation 
theory involve[s] feigning fidelity to the source of information."52 This 
meaning of deception is unambiguous and makes it easy to understand the 
first prong in the two-prong test. Although some argue that it may not 
always be clear when disclosure is required,53 at least it is clear that the 
deceptive requirement is met when there is nondisclosure. 
2. The 'in connection with" requirement: a balancing test 
The Court failed to provide adequate guidance for the second prong 
of the two-part test. Here, instead of drawing a bright line that lower 
courts can follow, the Supreme Court created a balancing test to deter-
mine whether or not something is 'in connection with' a securities trans-
action.54 A fuzzy connecting line was drawn between the misappropria-
tion of confidential information and the selling or purchasing of securities 
to meet the 'in connection with' standard required by § 10(b).55 The 
Court said that ordinarily misappropriated information that is used in a 
securities transaction obtains its value through the trade itself, whereas 
misappropriating money which is then used to purchase securities will 
not meet the 'in connection with' test because the money has value out-
side of the securities trade. 56 Therefore, the misappropriation is consum-
mated through the securities transaction. By using terminology such as 
'ordinarily,' the Court made it unclear as to what the boundaries of the 
'in connection with' requirement are. 
Both the dissent and the respondent made forceful arguments that 
many other things could be done with information besides exchanging 
51. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2209. 
52. /d. 
53. See Hiler, supra note 6, at 2-4. 
54. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2221 (Thomas. J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
55. See id. at 2226. 
56. See id. at 2210. ("Substitute 'ordinarily' for 'only,' and the Government is on the 
mark."). 
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securities.57 The majority however, rejected these arguments and de-
scribed them as inventive, telling, and imaginative.58 Regardless of the 
creativity involved in the arguments, the point remains that it is plausible 
that misappropriated information could have value outside the mere value 
of the securities transaction. 
It could also be argued that, in many cases, the misappropriation of 
some information is only one step in a series of events leading to a securi-
ties transaction. Will a small amount of misappropriated information still 
be enough to incur insider trading liability under§ 10(b) and Rule lOb-5? 
For example, what if the misappropriator obtains information, but does 
not rely on that information alone and seeks further advice. After looking 
at an analyst's interpretation of the situation, and then combining that 
additional information with the information already misappropriated, will 
there be sufficient disconnection to remove§ lO(b) liability? By refusing 
to acknowledge such arguments, the majority forced the lower courts to 
address them. The lower courts then, without sufficient guidance, are re-
sponsible to determine whether or not something is closely enough 'in 
connection with' the transaction to incur liability. This may result in rul-
ings so inconsistent that due process concerns may be raised. 59 For exam-
ple, if people are not aware that their action constitutes a crime and are 
arrested, it will be easy to argue that the arrest took place without due 
process of the law. 
The Court reasoned that "[s]hould a misappropriator put such infor-
mation to other use, the statute's prohibition would not be implicated."60 
Instead of clarifying the 'in connection with' requirement, such a state-
ment confuses the issue. Lower courts are required to apply a balancing 
test to determine how information has been used. This statement implies 
that some information can have value outside the realm of trading securi-
ties. The Court suggested that any property or information that has "value 
to the malefactor apart from their use in a securities transaction"61 should 
not be subject to the 'in connection with' requirement. But as the dissent 
argued, "[i]f the relevant test under the 'in connection with' language is 
whether the fraudulent act is necessarily tied to a securities transaction, 
then the misappropriation of confidential information used to trade no 
more violates § 1 O(b) than does the misappropriation of funds used to 
trade."62 Although the majority argued that "[i]t is hardly remarkable that 
57. See id. at 2223-24; See also Transcript of Oral Argument at 33-34, O'Hagan, 117 S. 
Ct. at 2199. 
58. See 117 S. Ct. at 2210 n.8. 
59. See id. at 2220. 
60. /d. at 2209. 
61. /d. 
62. /d. at 2223-24 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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a rule suitably applied to the fraudulent uses of certain kinds of informa-
tion would be stretched beyond reason were it applied to the fraudulent 
use of money."63 The same argument can surely be applied to the misap-
propriation of information. Here, it seems as if the majority made its deci-
sion and simply tried to make the meaning fit within its own parameters. 
A valid argument was recognized, but the majority put the argument aside 
as trivial and even comical.64 
In response to the majorities argument, Justice Thomas argued that: 
Once the Government's construction of the misappropriation theory is 
accurately described and accepted-along with its implied construction 
of§ IO(b)'s 'in connection with' language-that theory should no lon-
ger cover cases ... involving fraud on the source of information where 
the source has no connection with the other participant in a securities 
transaction. It seems obvious that the undisclosed misappropriation of 
confidential information is not necessarily consummated by a securities 
transaction.65 
This argument, regardless of how obvious to the dissent, was not so obvi-
ous to the majority. 
The majority's decision is bound to cause extensive problems in the 
lower courts. "The absence of a coherent and consistent misappropriation 
theory and, by necessary implication, a coherent and consistent applica-
tion of the statutory 'use or employ, in connection with' language, is par-
ticularly problematic."66 The type of balancing test created in this case 
will truly be problematic in the extensive litigation that is sure to come 
from the majority's decision. 
B. Problems with Balancing Tests 
Although balancing tests can be helpful in certain situations, there are 
some instances, such as this one, where a balancing test should be more 
clearly defined or not used at all. When the Supreme Court makes deci-
sions that are ambiguous, they are essentially guaranteeing the opportu-
nity to revisit the issue. There may be some instances, such as when an 
issue is not fully ripe, where the Court purposely leaves an issue un-
touched. This is wise in certain instances. However, there are other in-
stances where serious problems can result from the ambiguities of a bal-
ancing test. 
63. /d. at 2209-10. 
64. See id. at 2210 n.8. 
65. /d. at 2223 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
66. /d. at 2226 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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1. Some significant problems with previous balancing tests 
One of the strongest arguments against creating a balancing test is 
that "it does not provide a useful standard for discovery."67 Although in 
reaching their decision, the majority relied on the safeguards created by 
Congress, they failed to recognize that those safeguards will vary from 
case to case. An example mentioned by Professor Benjamin Lindquist, an 
opponent of balancing tests, is illustrative of the point. As an attorney 
attempts to counsel a client on whether or not she will be held liable un-
der a balancing test such as the 'in connection with' test, the attorney, "is 
given no concrete assistance from the balancing test. He must first litigate 
the issue because the balancing test approaches each situation individu-
ally and provides different solutions for the cases depending upon the 
circumstances involved."68 As a result, the test fails one of the most im-
portant underlying principles of establishing a rule which is that it does 
not present attorneys with clear and practical guidelines.69 
If an attorney is to effectively counsel a client, she must have a good 
idea of how a case will most likely play out. Not just lawyers and clients, 
but all concerned parties should know with reasonable certainty what 
type of behavior is legal and what is not. 
A second problem with balancing tests is that they are judicially inef-
ficient. "As the test consists of a case-by-case analysis, the issue must be 
litigated every time it arises. The balancing test runs contrary to the trend 
of decreasing courtroom traffic and legal expenses."70 Although it may be 
argued that allowing each person to litigate her own case can be in the 
best interest of each potential § lO(b) or Rule lOb-5 violator, it is not in 
the best interest of the system as a whole. There are certain situations 
where "the vagueness and inadequacy of the test outweigh the benefits it 
creates.'m Such is the case with the 'in connection with test.' 
2. Examples of previously inefficient balancing tests that require 
revisiting 
There are many examples throughout the Court's history where a bal-
ancing test was created and later proved to be so inefficient that it had to 
be revisited and changed. Although no example is completely analogous 
to the 'in connection with' balancing test, examples are helpful in show-
67. Benjamin Lloyd Lindquist, Note, Ethical Considerations in Model Rule 4.2 "s 
Application to the Corporate Litigant, 20 J. LEGAL PROF. 267, 282 (1996). 
68. /d. 
69. See /d. 
70. /d. 
71. /d. 
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ing some of the general inadequacies of balancing tests. One such exam-
ple can be seen in the way the Court has treated a state's interference in 
an individual's right to exercise religion. At one point, "the Supreme 
Court established a balancing test to weigh the competing interests of an 
individual's right to exercise religion freely and a state's need to restrict 
that right."72 Although this balancing test seemed to be an appropriate 
decision at the time it was made, the issue had to be revisited.73 Ulti-
mately, "[i]n an attempt to maximize the protection of religious freedom, 
the Supreme Court replaced the balancing test with the least restrictive 
alternative test."74 
Another example of a balancing test that proved inefficient was the 
Court's attempt to protect an individual's Fourth Amendment right 
against unlawful searches and seizures. A great deal of criticism has been 
made in regards to this balancing test, and it is likely to be revisited in the 
future. One author speaks about the inadequacy of the Court's balancing 
test process, focusing on Vernonia School District 471 v. Acton,75 which 
is arguably "the most recent, and most alarming, example of the inade-
quacy of the Court's balancing test."76 Here, Professor Buffaloe argues 
that when there is a loosely defined rule created by the Court (such as the 
'in connection with' prong in O'Hagan) "the balancing test triggered by 
the language is so malleable and unprincipled it fails to adequately safe-
guard" a defendant's rights.77 
An additional example is cited by Professor Charles who aptly speaks 
of the problems of a balancing test for issues arising under the Fourth 
Amendment.78 He argues that balancing tests favor the government be-
cause balancing tests for Constitutional questions allow the government 
to circumvent the traditional standards that the Founders meant to be ap-
plied.79 The author also gives a fairly comprehensive list of additional 
arguments that have been given against the Fourth Amendment balancing 
test. 80 The same is true of the 'in connection with' balancing test. By creat 
72. James J. Lawless, Jr., Roy v. Cohen: Social Security Numbers and the Free Exercise 
Clause, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 217, 223 (1986). 
73. See id. at 224, 244; See also Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 
452 U.S. 640, 654-56 (1981). 
74. !d. at 224. 
75. 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995). 
76. Jennifer Y. Buffaloe, Note, 'Special Needs' and the Fourth Amendment: An Exception 
Poised to Swallow the Warrant Preference Rule, 32 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 529, 532 (1997). 
77. !d. at 551. 
78. Gut-Uriel E. Charles, Fourth Amendment Accommodations: (Un)compelling Public 
Needs, Balancing Acts, and the Fiction of Consent, 2 MICH. J. RACE & L. 461,512. 
79. See id. 
80. See id. at 512 n.l52 (For criticism of the balancing test see Skinner v. Railway Labor 
Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 635, 639 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that "[p]recisely 
because the need for action against the drug scourge is manifest, the need for vigilance against 
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ing a balancing test for the 'in connection with' requirement, the Court 
has provided a way for lower courts to even further broaden the meaning 
of the statute, which will allow courts to randomly rule against individu-
als pursuant to the court's interest and not according to established law. 
3. Applying the balancing test concerns to the 'in connection with' test 
As shown in the previous examples, the creation of a balancing test 
for the 'in connection with requirement,' created the risk that lower 
courts may interpret the rule in different ways.81 Balancing tests generate 
more litigation because of the uncertainty of the outcome of such litiga-
tion. Such uncertainty in a criminal setting raises due process concems.82 
Another problem with the 'in connection with' test is that in some 
respects this ruling counters the purpose of the Securities and Exchange 
Act of 1934. The purpose of that act is to establish honesty and integrity 
in the securities market and promote confidence in the market partici-
pants.83 Although Congress provided safeguards,84 there are still some 
serious questions as to who may be liable under the 'in connection with' 
test. Because of this uncertainty as to liability, confidence in the market 
may deteriorate to a certain degree. The more one anticipates a possibility 
of criminal liability for her actions, the less likely one will be to partici-
pate in the market. Even though holding misappropriators liable will al-
low some to have more confidence in the market, other less sophisticated 
participants may not be so confident for fear of being suddenly and per-
haps unknowingly characterized as an insider.85 
unconstitutional excess is great," and commenting on the malleability of a balancing search); see 
also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 944 
(1987) (arguing that "complacency blinds us to serious problems in the mechanics of balancing"); 
Karnisar, supra note 6, at 33 (noting that it is not surprising that the government interests prevail 
when the balancing test is used. "This is usually the result when the Court utilizes what dissenters 
aptly called 'a formless and unguided "reasonableness" balancing inquiry.' "); Nadine Strossen, The 
Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting the Scales Through the Least Intrusive 
Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y. U. L. REV. 1173, 1188-89 (1988) (maintaining that use of the 
balancing test contributes to the erosion of Fourth Amendment rights); Sundby, supra note 61, at 
400 (arguing that the balancing test favors government intrusion)). 
81. See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2226 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). 
82. See Respondents Brief at 30, O'Hagan. 
83. See IS U.S.C. § 78(b). 
84. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2214. 
85. This Note does not address the requirement of scienter, which in short is the knowledge 
that a crime is being committed, but suffice it to say that juries are unpredictable and even though 
there is a stricter requirement before imprisonment will be mandated, the requirement is not so 
strict for financial penalties. 
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VI. OTHER OPTIONS 
The Supreme Court has created some difficult questions through the 
O'Hagan decision, but the purpose of this note is not to condone 
misappropriators of information. Holding misappropriators liable for their 
actions is an important requirement if the securities market is to function 
efficiently.86 The Court, however, had better alternatives than the balanc-
ing test in O'Hagan. 
A. Remove the Ambiguity From the 'In Connection With' Test 
Perhaps the simplest thing to do would have been to remove the am-
biguity from the 'in connection with' test. This could be done by elimi-
nating the requirement of interpreting the value of information outside the 
realm of the securities exchange. 87 If lower courts could decide a case 
without determining whether the misappropriated information had "value 
to the malefactor apart from [its] use in a securities transaction," then it 
would be easier to establish guilt or innocence.88 The status quo requires 
courts to determine whether the misappropriation is "sufficiently de-
tached from a subsequent securities transaction" before establishing lia-
bility .89 Misappropriators should know that if they obtain material, 
nonpublic information then they should either disclose that information 
or refrain from trading until the information becomes public. 
B. Let Congress Make the Bright-line Test 
One option discussed in Respondent's Brief as well as the Amici 
Briefs is to allow Congress to codify the misappropriation theory.90 Since 
Congress originally created the statute, the Court could "allow Congress 
to change the statutory prohibition if it so desires."91 The one problem 
with this idea is that Congress has had the chance to codify the misappro-
priation theory and has refused to do so.92 As the amici for Respondent 
argue, "the full record of Congress' consideration of the misappropriation 
theory ... demonstrat[es] that Congress in fact declined to amend the 
1934 Act to criminalize trading on misappropriated information, and that 
it did so at the S.E.C.' s urging."93 
86. See supra, part I. 
87. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2209. 
88. /d. 
89. !d. 
90. See Respondant's Brief, O'Hagan; see also Amici Briefs for Respondent, O'Hagan. 
91. Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors and Counsel in Support of Respondent at 4, 
O'Hagan. 
92. See id. at 10, O'Hagan. 
93. /d. at 14, O'Hagan. 
147] MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY 161 
Since the Court has developed the misappropriation theory through 
case Jaw, Congress now has no need to fill in the gap left by the broad 
language of§ IO(b). The Court seems to be sending a message to Con-
gress that if the statutory language is broad enough, then the courts will 
take care of the rest on a case-by-case basis. This is in contradiction to a 
great deal of judicial opinion that has petitioned Congress to be specific 
in statutory language.94 By ruling against the misappropriation theory, the 
Court would have been telling Congress that it needs to fill its own gaps 
instead of leaving it up to the courts. 
C. Establish Liability under Different Statutes 
Another possibility the Court had was to simply let liability be estab-
lished through other statutes. For example, state fiduciary duty laws are 
generally adequate to impose liability for the types of acts being de-
scribed by the misappropriation theory. The majority even recognized 
this possibility in a footnote but failed to see that such laws are sufficient 
to deter misappropriators until Congress codifies the misappropriation 
theory. The majority said, "once a disloyal agent discloses his imminent 
breach of duty, his principal may seek appropriate equitable relief under 
state law."95 Misappropriating information would generally be enough to 
show a breach of a fiduciary duty since the agent would not be acting in 
the interest of the principal. This would allow the principal to recover any 
damages suffered from the breach. The courts could also impose punitive 
damages to further deter would-be misappropriators. Since there may be 
instances where damages may not be fully recoverable, the Rule 10b-5 
threat of imprisonment is more appealing to the courts. But breach-of-
duty laws should ordinarily cover any damages incurred by the principal. 
The greatest amount of injury coming from misappropriated informa-
tion used in a securities transaction will generally be in the form of dam-
ages to the person or entity to whom there is owed a fiduciary duty. Jus-
tice demands that the person causing such harm should pay for the dam-
ages, and that the person damaged should be compensated. Establishing 
liability under breach-of-duty laws will make misappropriators pay for 
the harm they cause to the person who is harmed. 
Although this type of liability would not impose criminal sanctions 
for the damages, it will nevertheless deter illegal activity that takes place 
through the trading of securities based on misappropriated information. 
Additionally, if the courts refuse to interpret statutes in the broadest way 
94. See Williams v. United States, 458 U.S. 279, 290 (1982); See also Dunn v. Commodity 
Futures Trading Comm"n, 117 S. Ct. 913, 921 (1997). 
95. O'Hagan 117 S. Ct. at 2211 n.9. 
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possible, then it is more likely that Congress will write statutes more 
clearly. Even if criminal liability is not available under a breach of some 
type of fiduciary relationship, Congress will have an incentive to create 
criminal liability for missappropriators instead of relying on the courts to 
create the liability because of an ambiguous statute. Furthermore, many 
states have laws that impose criminal liability for fraud or deceit. If lower 
courts are required to impose liability for the misappropriation of infor-
mation, they should at least be able to do so based on a statute and not on 
a rule in the form of a balancing test which is judicially legislated. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
A. The Court's Decision Helped Establish Some Boundaries 
Although the Supreme Court's decision is helpful in some respects, it 
caused greater confusion in other respects. It is now clear that the misap-
propriation theory is to be considered a valid theory to create insider trad-
ing liability under§ IO(b) and Rule lOb-5 and certain boundaries have 
been created that help courts as well as perpetrators understand when 
someone should be held liable. These boundaries are helpful and can be 
of great importance in establishing guidelines for lower courts to use 
when applying the misappropriation theory. But some boundaries are still 
lacking. 
B. The Remaining Boundaries Need to be Clearly Defined 
One flaw of this decision is that it is unclear how the second step of 
the two-prong test should be applied. A balancing test has been created 
which will be difficult to follow in the future. This problem could be 
solved in various ways, including the intervention of Congress and estab-
lishing different types of liability instead of just § 1 O(b) and Rule 1 Ob-5 
liability. This would allow investors to be liable for damages caused, but 
would not impose criminal liability from an uncertain, ambiguous, and 
judicially legislated balancing test. 
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